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Abstract
We formulate a mixed oligopoly model in which one state-owned public enterprise com-
petes with n private rms in the same market and m private rms in the neighboring market.
We investigate how n and m aect the optimal degree of privatization. We nd a nonmono-
tone (monotone) relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the number of
private competitors in the neighboring (same) market. The optimal degree of privatization
is increasing in the number of private rms in the same market, and the relationship between
the optimal degree of privatization and the number of private competitors in the neighboring
market is an inverted U-shape. An increase in m more likely increases the optimal degree
of privatization when the degree of product dierentiation is low. Our results suggest that
more competitive pressure from competitors supplying dierentiated products can reduce
the optimal degree of privatization.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we formulate the following two-product model. Product A and Product B are
imperfectly substitutable products (dierentiated products). In the Product A market, there is
one state-owned public enterprise and n private enterprises, while in the Product B market, there
are m private enterprises. All enterprises face Cournot competition. We investigate how n and
m aect the optimal degree of privatization of the public enterprise. We nd that the optimal
degree of privatization is increasing with the number of private enterprises in the same market
(Product A market). However, the relationship between the optimal degree of privatization
and m are nonmonotone (inverted U-shaped). Our result suggests that stronger competitive
pressure from the market in which the public enterprise exists increases the optimal degree of
privatization, while stronger competitive pressure from the neighboring market might not.1
In the literature on mixed oligopolies2, many studies already investigated the relationship
between privatization policy and the number of private competitors. De Fraja and Delbono
(1989) formulated a model of mixed oligopolies in which a welfare-maximizing public enterprise
competes against n private enterprises in a homogeneous product market. The authors assumed
that both public and private enterprises have an identical cost function and showed that full
privatization more likely improves welfare when n is larger. Matsumura and Shimizu (2010)
showed that this result holds even when multiple public enterprises exist and a cost dierence
between public and private enterprises is allowed. Lin and Matsumura (2012) adopted the partial
privatization approach formulated by Matsumura (1998) and showed that the optimal degree of
privatization is increasing with the number of private enterprises regardless of the nationality
1Mixed oligopolies in which state-owned public enterprises compete with private enterprises exist globally, and
in many countries, privatization of these public enterprises is an important policy issue. The Japanese government
partially privatized Japan Post, Postal Bank, and Kampo in 2015, sold a small share of Japan Post in 2017 again,
and still holds the majority share in all three entities. The Brazilian government privatized major companies,
such as Emnraer, and plans to privatize larger companies further, such as Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A. The
Vietnamese government recently changed its privatization policy from full to partial privatization (keeping at
least a 35% share) in 12 major national companies (Nikkei Newspaper, 2017/8/30, 2017/9/19).
2For important examples of mixed oligopolies and recent development of the analysis of mixed oligopolies, see
Heywood and Ye (2009), Bose et al. (2014), and Chen (2017).
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of them. Matsumura and Okamura (2015) showed this is true even when private enterprises
maximize relative prot rather than absolute prots.3 The implication of these studies is clear:
the more competitive pressure public enterprises receive from private companies, the more the
government should privatize the public enterprises.
All studies mentioned above assumed homogeneous product markets. However, many public
enterprises are under competitive pressure from not only the same market but also from suppliers
in highly dierentiated but substitutable products for the public enterprises' products. For
example, the Japanese public broadcasting corporation, NHK, competes with several private
companies, such as Nippon Television Network Corporation, in the TV broadcasting market, and
both NHK and private companies also compete with internet TV and/or cable TV companies
in neighboring markets. Postal Bank, a major public nancial institution in Japan, directly
competes with many commercial banks, such as Mizuho Bank, and indirectly competes with
many other investment banks, such as Nomura Securities Co., Ltd. In Japan, several public gas
companies, such as Business Administration of Otsu city, compete with private gas enterprises,
such as Osaka Gas Co., Ltd., in the gas market and those gas companies also compete with
other energy companies, such as Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., which is a major player in
the electric power market. NTT Docomo, in which the Japanese government indirectly owns
the share, competes with KDDI and Softbank as mobile network operators, and those three
companies compete with many small virtual mobile network operators. In such situations,
the optimal degree of privatization must depend on the number of competitors in neighboring
markets as well as that in the market in which the public enterprise exists.
In this study, we adopt Singh and Vives' (1984) linear demand model, which is popular in
the literature on mixed oligopolies.4 However, our model has one important deviation from
3The relative prot maximization approach enables us to use the single quantity competition model to treat
various competition structures, from collusive to perfectly competitive cases. Thus, this result implies that the
optimal degree of privatization is increasing with the number of private enterprises under various competition
structures. For a discussion on relative prot maximization, see Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Mat-
sumura et al. (2013).
4See Barcena-Ruiz (2007), Fujiwara (2007), Ishida and Matsushima (2009), Matsumura and Ogawa (2012,
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their model formulation. In their model, each dierentiated product is produced by only one
enterprise, while in our model, each dierentiated product is supplied by multiple enterprises.5
In other words, we consider a model in which competition within homogeneous product markets
and competition across the two dierentiated markets coexist. We nd that the optimal degree
of privatization is increasing with the number of private competitors in the same market of the
public enterprise, whereas the relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the
number of private competitors in the neighboring market is nonmonotone (inverted U-shaped).
Our result suggests that if public enterprises compete with a small number of private competi-
tors in the same market and a large number of private competitors in neighboring markets,
the optimal degree of privatization is small. This situation is typically observed in Japanese
gas markets. The Japanese government concluded that gas companies face tough competition
with electric power companies, although the competition in gas markets is not in fact tough
(Report, Strategic Policy Committee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy,
2015/1/13). Our result suggests possible welfare loss of the privatization of gas companies in
Japan even if the public gas companies receive severe competitive pressure from the neighboring
market.
2 The Model
We adopt a standard model with two dierentiated products, Product A and Product B, and
linear demand (Singh and Vives (1984)). Product A is supplied by one state-owned public rm,
rm 0, and n private rms (rm 1; 2; :::; n). Product B is supplied by m private rms (rm
n+ 1; n+ 2; :::; n+m). The quasi-linear utility function of the representative consumer is
U(QA; QB; y) = a(QA +QB)  Q
2
A + 2QAQB +Q
2
B
2
+ y; (1)
2014), Nakamura (2013), and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016).
5Yoshida (2017) formulated a private oligopoly model in which two dierentiated products are supplied by
multiple enterprises. He showed that an increase in the number of enterprises in a market harms consumer surplus
when the number of enterprises is signicantly larger than that in the other market.
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where Qi is the consumption of Product i (i = A;B) and y is the consumption of an outside
good that is competitively provided (with a unitary price). Parameter a is a positive constant
and  2 (0; 1) represents a degree of product dierentiation (the smaller  is, the more Product
A and Product B are dierentiated). The inverse demand functions for Product i = A;B with
i 6= j are
pi = a Qi   Qj ; (2)
where pi is the price of product i.
The marginal cost of production is constant for all rms. We assume that common marginal
cost is zero for simplicity. Let qi be the output of rm i (i = 0; 1; :::; n +m). Then, we obtain
QA =
Pn
i=0 qi and QB =
Pn+m
i=n+1 qi. Let i be the prot of rm i (i = 0; 1; :::; n+m). i = pAqi
for i = 0; 1; :::; n and i = pBqi for i = n+1; n+2; :::; n+m. The objective of each private rm
is its own prot.
Following the standard approach formulated by Matsumura (1998), we assume that the
public rm's objective function is a convex combination of social welfare (the sum of consumer
surplus and all rms' prots) and its own prot. We denote this as

 = 0 + (1  )W;
where W is social welfare, given by
W = a(QA +QB)  Q
2
A + 2QAQB +Q
2
B
2
  pAQA   pBQB +
nX
i=0
i +
n+mX
i=n+1
i
= a(QA +QB)  Q
2
A + 2QAQB +Q
2
B
2
and  2 [0; 1] represents the degree of privatization. In the case of full nationalization (i.e.,
 = 0), rm 0 maximizes social welfare. In the case of full privatization (i.e.,  = 1), rm 0
maximizes its own prot.
The game runs as follows. In the rst stage, the government chooses the degree of privatiza-
tion  to maximize the social welfare. In the second stage, each rm simultaneously chooses its
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output to maximize its objective. We solve this game by backward induction and the equilibrium
concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Results
First, we solve the second-stage game, given . The rst-order conditions of public and private
rms are
@

@q0
= a QA   QB   q0 = 0;
@i
@qi
= a QA   QB   qi = 0 (i = 1; :::; n);
@i
@qi
= a QB   QA   qi = 0 (i = n+ 1; :::; n+m);
respectively. The second-order conditions are satised. These rst-order conditions yield the
following reaction functions of public and private rms
R0(QB; QA 0) =
a  QB  QA 0
1 + 
;
Ri(QB; QA i) =
a  QB  QA i
2
(i = 1; :::; n);
Ri(QA; QB i) =
a  QA  QB i
2
(i = n+ 1; :::; n+m);
respectively, where Qj i is total output of Product j except for rm i (j = A;B; i = 0; 1; :::;m).
We obtain the following equilibrium quantities of public and private rms
q0() =
(1 +m(1  ))a
(1 + )(1 +m) + (1 +m)n  (1 + n)m2 ;
qi () =
(1 +m(1  ))a
(1 + )(1 +m) + (1 +m)n  (1 + n)m2 (i = 1; :::; n);
qi () =
((1  )(1 + n) + )a
(1 + )(1 +m) + (1 +m)n  (1 + n)m2 (i = n+ 1; :::; n+m);
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respectively. We obtain the following equilibrium total output of Products A and B, and welfare
QA() =
a(1 + n)(1 +m(1  ))
(1 +m)(1 + (1 + n))  2m(n+ 1) ; (3)
QB() =
am((1  )(1 + n) + )
(1 +m)(1 + (1 + n))  2m(n+ 1) ; (4)
W () =
a2X
2((1 +m)(1 + (1 + n))  2m(n+ 1))2 ; (5)
respectively, whereX := 1+2+(2m+m2)(2+4+2)+2(1+)(2m2+4m+1)n+2n2(2m2+
4m+ 1)  2m(1 + n)(mn+ 2(m+ n) +m+ 3+ 2)  2m22(1 + n)2 + 23m2(1 + n)2.
We now present a result on the relationship between , QA, and QB
Lemma 1 (i) QA() is decreasing in , (ii) Q

B() is increasing in , and (iii) Q

A()+Q

B()
is decreasing in .
Proof
From (3) and (4), we obtain
@QA()
@
=   a(1 +m)(1 +m(1  ))
((1 +m)(1 + (1 + n))  2m(n+ 1))2 < 0;
@QB()
@
=
am(1 +m(1  ))
((1 +m)(1 + (1 + n))  2m(n+ 1))2 > 0;
@QA()
@
+
@QB()
@
=   a(1 +m(1  ))
2
((1 +m)(1 + (1 + n))  2m(n+ 1))2 < 0:
These results imply Lemma 1. 
The larger  is, the more the public rm is concerned with its own prot rather than consumer
surplus. Therefore, an increase in  makes the public rm less aggressive, and thus, directly
reduces the output of the public rm. An increase in  indirectly increases the output of each
private rm in both markets through strategic interaction. Because the direct eect dominates
the indirect strategic eect, an increase in  reduces QA. Because there is no direct eect in the
Product B market, an increase in  increases QB.
Next, we discuss the government's welfare maximization problem in the rst stage. From
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the rst-order condition for interior solution @W =@ = 0, we obtain6
 =
m(1  )
(m+ 1)2   m(n+m+ 2) + 2mn: (6)
We present a result on the optimal degree of privatization .
Proposition 1 (i)  > 0. (ii)  = 1 if n  ~n := 1+m(1 )(2 +m)m(1 ) ; otherwise  = .
Proof
(i) From (5), we obtain
@W 
@

=0
=
a2m(1  )(1 +m(1  ))
(1 +m(1  2))3 > 0
This implies Proposition 1(i).
(ii) Because the second-order condition is satised,  = 1 if and only if
@W 
@

=1
 0:
From (5), we obtain
@W 
@

=1
=
a2(1 +m(1  ))(m(1  )((1 + n)  (2 +m))  1)
(2 + n+ (2  2)m+ (1  2)nm)3 :
This is greater than or equal to zero if m(1   )((1 + n)   (2 + m))   1  0. Solving this
inequality with respect to n, we obtain n  ~n. This implies Proposition 1(ii). 
According to Proposition 1(i), full nationalization is never optimal, and similar results are
repeatedly shown in dierent contexts (Matsumura, 1998; Lin and Matsumura, 2012; Matsumura
and Okamura, 2015; Wu et al., 2016). A marginal increase in  from zero reduces QA, which
reduces welfare. However, this eect is second order (the envelope theorem) because QA(0) is
optimal given QB. A marginal increase in  from zero increase QB, which improves welfare. This
eect is rst order because the price exceeds the marginal cost, even when  = 0. Therefore, a
marginal increase in  from zero always improves welfare.
6The second-order condition is satised.
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According to Proposition 1(ii), full privatization is optimal if n is suciently large. When
n is suciently large, the Product A market is competitive, and thus, there is a small welfare-
reducing eect of a reduction of QA by an increase of . Therefore, the maximal  ( = 1) is
optimal.
We now present our main result, which shows the relationship between the optimal degree
of privatization and the number of private rms.
Proposition 2 (i)  is increasing in n. (ii)  is increasing (decreasing) in m for m <
p
1 
1 
(m >
p
1 
1  ).
Proof
From (6), we obtain
@
@n
=
m22(1  )2
((m+ 1)2   m(n+m+ 2) + 2mn)2 > 0:
This implies Proposition 2(i).
From (6), we obtain
@
@m
=
(1  )(1 m2(1  ))
((m+ 1)2   m(n+m+ 2) + 2mn)2 :
This is positive (negative) if 1  m2(1   ) > (<)0. Solving 1  m2(1   ) > 0 with respect to
m, we obtain m <
p
1 
1  . This implies Proposition 2(ii). 
According to Proposition 1(ii), the maximal degree of privatization (full privatization) is
more likely optimal when n is larger. According to Proposition 2(i), an increase in the number
of private rms in the same market increases the optimal degree of privatization when the
solution is interior. These results suggest that an increase in n accelerates privatization.
However, according to Proposition 2(ii), there is a nonmonotone relationship (inverted U-
shaped relationship) between  and m. Moreover, ~n in Proposition 1(ii) diverges to innity
when m ! 0 and m ! 1. This implies that the maximal degree of privatization (full pri-
vatization) is less likely optimal when m is suciently large or small. These results suggest a
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nonmonotone relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the number of private
competitors in the neighboring market.
To understand the intuition of Proposition 2, we present a result on the composition of the
two products.
Proposition 3 QA(
)=QB() > 1.
Proof
Substituting (6) into (3) and (4), we obtain
QA(
) =
a((m+ 1)2   m(m+ 2))
(m+ 1)2   2m(m+ 2) ;
QB(
) =
am(1 +m)(1 + )
(m+ 1)2   2m(m+ 2) :
Comparing theses values, we obtain
QA(
)=QB() = 1 +
1 +m(1  )
m(1 +m)(1  ) > 1:
This implies Proposition 3. 
We explain the intuition behind Proposition 3. Welfare depends on both the total output
level QA + QB and the output ratio QA=QB. Because prices are strictly positive (exceed the
marginal cost), an increase in QA + QB improves welfare given QA=QB (total output eect).
Given QA +QB, QA=QB = 1 is the best for welfare (composition eect).
An increase in  decreases QA+QB (Lemma 1(iii)), and thus, reduces welfare (total output
eect). An increase in  reduces QA (Lemma 1(i)) and increases QB (Lemma 1(ii)), and thus,
reduces QA=QB. A reduction of QA=QB reduces welfare if QA=QB  1 (composition eect).
Therefore, if QA=QB  1, a reduction of  improves welfare. We show that  > 0 (Proposition
1(i)). Under these conditions, QA=QB > 1 must hold in equilibrium.
We now explain the intuition behind our main result, Proposition 2. An increase in both
n and m mitigates the welfare loss of the total output eect, because more rms increase their
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output responding to an increase in , which partially compensates the reduction of q0. An
increase in n increases QA and reduces QB. Thus, an increase in n strengthens the welfare-
improving eect of the composition eect. Because an increase in n reduces the welfare loss of
the total output eect and increases the welfare gain of the composition eect, an increase in n
unambiguously increases the optimal degree of privatization.
By contrast, an increase in m increases QB and reduces QA. Thus, it weakens the welfare-
improving eect due to the composition eect. Because the total output eect and composition
eect move in the opposite directions, the eect becomes ambiguous. When m is large (small),
QA=QB is small (large), and thus, a decrease in QA=QB caused by an increase in the degree of
privatization improves welfare less (more). Therefore, an increase in m reduces (increases) the
optimal degree of privatization when m is large (small).
The larger  is (i.e., the lower the degree of product dierentiation is), the weaker the
composition eect is. Therefore, an increase in m more likely increases  when  is larger.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigate the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and the
number of private competitors. We nd that the optimal degree of privatization of the public rm
is increasing with the number of private rms in the same market, and that the optimal degree
of privatization is nonmonotone with the number of private rms in the neighboring market.
This result implies that an increase of the competitive pressure does not always accelerate
privatization.
Although we discuss a two-market model, we suppose that our principle can apply to a model
with more than two markets. An increase in the number of rms that supply more dierentiated
products from those supplied by the public rm is less likely to increase the optimal degree of
privatization.
In this study, we assume that both rms are domestic. However, the literature on mixed
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oligopolies suggests that in the homogeneous market, an increase in the number of private
competitors increases the optimal degree of privatization, regardless of the nationality of the
private rms. Therefore, our result might hold even if private rms are owned by foreign
investors.7 Extending our analysis to this direction remains for future research.
7Whether the private rm is domestic or foreign yields contrasting results in the literature on mixed oligopoly
in other contexts. See Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Barcena-Ruiz
and Garzon (2005 a,b). The optimal degree of privatization is decreasing with the foreign ownership rate in private
rms when the number of private rms is given exogenously (Lin and Matsumura, 2012), while it is increasing in
free-entry markets (Cato and Matsumura, 2012).
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